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THE EMPIRICAL EFFECTS 
 OF TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 
William H.J. Hubbard1 
 
 
Ever since Twombly and Iqbal introduced the doctrine of plausibility plead-
ing, a cottage industry of legal scholars (including myself) has undertaken to 
detect the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on litigants and case outcomes. Re-
sults so far have been equivocal, and it has been hard to make sense of the 
disparate methodologies and findings. In this paper, I develop a comprehen-
sive yet non-technical framework for empirically testing the effect of 
Twombly and Iqbal on lower courts and litigants, taking into account a wide 
range of confounding factors and the numerous ways in which Twombly and 
Iqbal may have indirectly affected litigant behavior. Using this framework, I 
test for effects of Twombly and Iqbal on district court and litigant behavior 
using two datasets—one of administrative data covering hundreds of thou-
sands of cases, and one of detailed, hand- and machine-coded docket and 
complaint data covering a representative sample of nearly 2,000 cases. I also 
review existing findings. Based on preliminary analyses, which are subject to 
revision as additional data is compiled, I find only limited evidence that 
Twombly and Iqbal, the two most important pleading cases in 50 years, have 
had a major effect on the behavior of lawyers and judges across all cases. 
Rates of dismissal with prejudice have held steady, motions to dismiss re-
main uncommon, and settlement and filing patterns have not changed appre-
ciably in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal. There is, however, evidence of ef-
fects on pro se plaintiffs. Further, while case outcomes have been largely un-
affected by Twombly and Iqbal, there is evidence that lawyers changed their 
pleading and motion practice in predictable ways in the wake of those cases.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a plaintiff’s complaint contain “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” 
As affirmed in the seminal case Conley v. Gibson, this “notice plead-
ing” standard required only that the pleading give the defendant no-
tice of the plaintiff’s grievance.1 A line from Conley became the mantra 
for this approach: “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief.”2  
When Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly3 “retired” this language from 
Conley, the result was “shockwaves through the legal community—for 
academics, practitioners, and judges alike.”4 Twombly was on its way 
to becoming one of the most cited case of all time, “notice pleading” 
was now “plausibility pleading,” and the academic reaction to 
Twombly reflected a sense that a revolution in pleading and court 
practice was underway.5 
Two years later, Ashcroft v. Iqbal elaborated on Twombly and reit-
erated the rule that “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for 
relief survives a motion to dismiss.”6 With Iqbal, the controversy over 
pleading standards intensified. Law review articles and congressional 
testimony predicted “devastating” consequences to civil litigants, espe-
cially employment discrimination plaintiffs, who often lack direct evi-
dence of the defendant’s motives at the outset of litigation and thus 
may be unable to plead sufficient factual detail to reach discovery.7 
This raises the question: After Twombly and Iqbal, how much 
changed? We have the benefit of a large body of empirical work in-
spired by Twombly and Iqbal (herein occasionally, “Twiqbal”). What 
have we learned? 
Surprisingly, given the strong academic reaction in the immediate 
wake of those cases, the empirical evidence to date has been inconclu-
sive. Indeed, every study of the rates at which motion to dismiss8 are 
                                               
1 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). 
2 355 U.S. at 45–46. 
3 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
4 Steinman (2010) at 1305. 
5 Hoffman (2008, p. 1235); Steinman (2010, p. 1310); Miller (2010, p. 28). 
6 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
7 Reinert (2011, p. 123); see also Spencer (2008); Cooper (2011, p. 960); Davis 
(2009); Rubin (2009). See also Schnapper (2009): “Twombly and Iqbal have 
brought about sweeping changes in the lower courts, all for the worse.” 
8 Throughout this paper, “motions to dismiss” and “dismissal” refer to mo-
tions to dismiss and dismissals for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. Nothing in this paper speaks to motions to dismiss on juris-
dictional grounds, or for failure to join an indispensable party, for example. 
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granted with prejudice9 has found no statistically significant change in 
grant rates after either Twombly or Iqbal, even for employment dis-
crimination cases.10  
Not all of the evidence indicates no effect, however. The best (and 
virtually only) evidence of a major effect of Twiqbal is Gelbach (2012), 
who, using data from Cecil et al. (2011a), finds the effect in the form of 
higher rates at which defendants file motions to dismiss, though 
courts grant the motions at the same rate before and after Twiqbal. 
Even here, though, the estimated lower bound of the effect (because of 
the methodology, it was not possible for Gelbach to estimate an upper 
bound) is about 1 percent of all cases, even for employment discrimi-
nation cases.11 The reason for this surprisingly small lower bound is 
that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted are rare, even after Iqbal. In 2010, motions to dismiss 
were filed in only 6 percent of cases, a rate that has not changed much 
over the past three decades.12  
In short, the literature to date provides little evidence of a seismic 
shift in pleading practice or a differential impact on employment dis-
crimination cases after Twiqbal. But the evidence does not close the 
door to the possibility of a large effect, either. The literature has been 
plagued by serious methodological limitations, including small sample 
sizes, non-representative samples, failure to account for selection ef-
fects, and use of coarse data or proxies for the true outcomes of inter-
est. Thus, no single study has been able to prove or disprove a sub-
stantial impact of Twombly and Iqbal on the behavior of courts and, in 
turn, on the fortunes of plaintiffs and defendants.  
Now is the time to take stock of the effect of Twiqbal in a more 
comprehensive way. Earlier studies have each contributed important 
pieces of the larger puzzle, but large gaps remain. In this paper, I aim 
to fill the major gaps in the literature and begin to patch together a 
mosaic of results that allow us to see, in a more holistic way, the ex-
tent to which Twombly and Iqbal have changed civil litigation—not 
just the granting and denial of motions to dismiss, but settlement pat-
terns, the content of pleadings, and the willingness of plaintiffs to file 
suit in the first place. While the mosaic of empirical results on this 
question will never be complete—there is always more work to be 
                                               
9 Unless specifically noted, “dismissal” refers to dismissal with prejudice, in-
cluding both (1) judicial orders foreclosing the possibility of amendment and 
(2) dismissals with leave to amend, when the plaintiff is unable to replead in 
a way that meets the pleading standard announced by the court. 
10 See Part II. And as I discuss below, in my own earlier study of Twombly (I 
did not have data on Iqbal at the time), I was able to reach a fairly precise 
estimate of zero for the effect of Twombly on dismissals. 
11 See Part II. 
12 See Cecil et al. (2011a,b) (reporting data for 2010) and Willging (1989) 
(finding motion to dismiss filings in 6 to 12 percent of cases in 1988). 
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done—my goal in this paper is to organize enough fragments that the 
big picture becomes intelligible. 
At this point, I must make clear exactly what this paper seeks to 
measure. What does it mean to say that Twombly or Iqbal had “an ef-
fect”? Given that Twombly and Iqbal define the standard by which a 
motion to dismiss is granted or denied, their only direct effect on be-
havior will be on the propensity of district judges to grant motions to 
dismiss. Any other changes that emanate from these decisions will be 
the indirect consequence of this direct effect. For example, deterrence 
of plaintiffs from filing suits in federal court would stem from the fact 
that a greater likelihood of dismissal may reduce a plaintiff’s chances 
of reaching discovery—and therefore her chances of a favorable set-
tlement or trial verdict. Thus, holding all else equal, if Twombly and 
Iqbal have had any effect at all, they must have changed the tendency 
of district court judges to grant motions to dismiss. Of course, all else 
may not be equal. If plaintiffs’ lawyers, recognizing an increased 
chance of dismissal, respond to Twiqbal by filing fewer cases or draft-
ing longer and more detailed complaints, then Twiqbal will have had 
effects, even if we see no rise in dismissals. As Dodson (2015) notes, 
strategic responses by actors in the “litigation marketplace” attenuate 
direct measures of judicial willingness to dismiss in the wake of Twiq-
bal. 
This points us toward two ways of detecting the effect of Twiqbal. 
One way, which I will call the “causal identification” method, is based 
on the idea that if we can hold all else equal, we can simply look to 
dismissal rates to detect an effect. If dismissals rise after Twombly or 
Iqbal, then we have found the hypothesized effect. The other way, 
which I will call the “process of elimination” method, is based on the 
idea that if we cannot hold all else equal, and we do not find changes 
in dismissal rates, then we can look for changes elsewhere that reflect 
likely strategic responses of lawyers and parties to the (unobserved) 
direct effect of Twiqbal. In this paper, I use both of these methods to 
measure the effects of Twiqbal. 
The first contribution of this paper, therefore, is methodological. I 
show how the entire existing literature can be understood as contrib-
uting to one of these two methodological strands: the causal-
identification approach and the process-of-elimination approach. Each 
strand has different potential threats to the validity of the estimates, 
and each strand measures different potential effects of Twiqbal. By 
providing a unifying framework for interpreting their results, this pa-
per demonstrates the distinct contribution of each prior study in this 
field, as well as the key gaps that need to be filled before increasingly 
confident judgments about the effects of Twiqbal can be made. 
This paper then fills those gaps. The second contribution of the pa-
per is to bring two new datasets to bear on unresolved questions about 
the effects of Twiqbal. First, I have compiled administrative data on 
over 400,000 civil cases filed in federal court from 2003 through 2010. 
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This dataset, which I call the “AO Data,” is constructed from data files 
on terminated and pending cases published by the Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts (AO). Its primary limitation is that it 
provides only a limited set of information on each case; its strength is 
that it contains every civil case to pass through the federal courts, re-
gardless of whether it resulted in a court opinion (whether published 
or not), or whether it was dismissed, settled, or taken to judgment. 
Second, I have collected a representative sample of docket records 
and complaints in federal civil cases filed from 2005 through 2010, and 
employed automated text analysis and old-fashioned hand coding to 
create a detailed dataset of federal court complaints filed during this 
period, and the fates they met. This data is drawn directly from the 
U.S. Courts’ electronic case filing and docketing system, through its 
public access interface, PACER. This dataset, which I call the “PACER 
Data,” contains information on over 1800 docket sheets and com-
plaints in federal employment discrimination lawsuits filed between 
2005 and 2010.  
Using both the AO Data and PACER Data, and employing both the 
causal-identification and process-of-elimination methods, I look for 
evidence of Twiqbal’s effect and integrate these findings with the ex-
isting literature. What I find is a fairly detailed and coherent picture 
of the effects of Twombly and Iqbal. Twombly and Iqbal have led to a 
greater frequency in filings of motions to dismiss and the amendment 
of complaints. But there is little evidence that Twombly or Iqbal pre-
cipitated a major change in dismissals with prejudice, settlement pat-
terns, or filing rates. 
In Part II, I review the existing literature. In Part III, I describe 
the AO Data and the PACER Data. In Part IV, I specify my two meth-
odological approaches and present new empirical results under both 
methodologies. In Part V, I take stock of the mosaic of existing and 
new results presented in this paper, filling out the picture of the ef-
fects of Twiqbal. 
Before I proceed, however, I must emphasize a crucial understand-
ing about the claims that I make in this paper. It is safe to reject, a 
priori, the claim that Twiqbal has affected no cases. Given that the 
federal courts see approximately a quarter-million new case filings 
each year (and there are potentially millions of disputes that could be 
filed in federal court, but aren’t), there must surely be some disputes—
hundreds? thousands?—whose outcome has turned on the presence or 
absence of plausibility pleading under Twiqbal. 
Likewise, it should be clear from my definition of “effect” that not 
all cases have been affected by Twiqbal. There are certainly some cas-
es that have complaints such that they would never be dismissed ei-
ther before or after Twiqbal, and there are some cases that, for what-
ever reason, have complaints such that they would be dismissed even 
before Twiqbal, let alone after. 
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Any discussion, therefore, of Twiqbal’s “effect” must begin with the 
shared understanding that Twiqbal has had an effect. The only ques-
tion is whether the effect is relatively large or relatively small.  
I also offer three notes of clarification as to scope. First, my focus is 
entirely on quantitative evidence of the impact of Twombly and Iqbal. 
I make no claims in this paper about qualitative evidence; for a dis-
cussion of qualitative evidence on the effect of Twiqbal, see Hubbard 
(2016).  
Second, I do not address the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on legal 
doctrine, a topic that has been explored by a literature too vast to 
summarize here. I merely note that the effects of Twiqbal on legal doc-
trine and on legal practice may be different. 
Third, the goal of this paper is to determine whether Twombly and 
Iqbal had a substantial effect on legal practice. There is much to be 
said about why we see the patterns that we see in the data, but I ad-
dress such questions only briefly in this paper. In Hubbard (2016), I 
develop a more comprehensive account of why Twombly and Iqbal 
would generate such effects. 
II. FINDINGS SO FAR 
Over the past half-decade, a large number of studies have attempted 
to quantify the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on federal civil litigation. 
I will discuss them briefly here, returning to them as I build them into 
the analytical framework in Part IV. For a more thoroughgoing sur-
vey, see Engstrom (2013). 
Every published study of the effect of Twombly on dismissal rates 
has found no statistically significant effect. Hannon (2008), Hatamyar 
(2010), Hatamyar Moore (2012), Seiner (2009 and 2010), and Brescia 
(2012) all used data from published court opinions (i.e., opinions 
available on Westlaw, etc.) before and after Twombly, and none finds a 
statistically significant change in the share of cases granting motions 
to dismiss (with prejudice).13 This is true regardless of whether the 
study looks across case types or focuses on civil rights or employment 
discrimination cases. 
Studies on Iqbal, or the combined effect of Twombly and Iqbal, 
largely reach the same conclusion. Cecil et al. (2011a,b), Hatamyar 
Moore (2012), and Brescia (2012) found a rise in dismissals without 
prejudice after Iqbal, but no change in dismissals with prejudice. The 
distinction between dismissals with and without prejudice matters, 
because a study focused on the ultimate effect of dismissals without 
prejudice concluded that, after accounting for amended complaints 
                                               
13 As I note in Hubbard (2013), Hannon (2008) reports a single significant 
result in one of his regressions, but this is due to a specification error. A cor-
rected regression on the same data (not reported, on file with author) yields 
no significant effect.  
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and subsequent motions to dismiss, there was zero change in the 
share of cases dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) from the pre-Twombly to 
the post-Iqbal period (Cecil et al. 2011b).14 Thus, the fact that several 
studies found increases in dismissals with leave to amend, but no 
change in dismissals with prejudice, suggests little effect on the share 
of cases effectively terminated by a ruling on a motion to dismiss. 
Isaacharoff and Miller (2013, 454) identified 236 federal appellate 
court decisions from 2011 reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. Of these, 199 did not involve the factual 
sufficiency of the complaint (i.e., the specific pleading standard affect-
ed by Twiqbal). Thus, the upper bound on cases potentially affected by 
Twombly and Iqbal is 37 out of 236, or less than 16 percent. If this mix 
of dismissals at the appellate level corresponds to the mix at the dis-
trict level (and of course it may not), and given that even after Iqbal 
only about 2 percent of cases are dismissed for failure to state a claim, 
this suggests an upper bound of the potential reach of Twombly and 
Iqbal at less than one-half of 1 percent of cases. 
Dodson (2012) found a small but statistically significant increase 
in grants of motions to dismiss after Iqbal, although the analysis 
pooled together dismissals with and without leave to amend. Dodson 
examined rulings on motions to dismiss on a claim-by-claim basis, 
comparing pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal periods. It is not clear from 
this analysis, however, whether there has been any meaningful 
change in the termination (rather than simply repleading) of claims, 
let alone entire cases; as noted above, Cecil et al. (2011b) find that a 
spike in dismissals without prejudice after Iqbal was not associated 
with higher rates of ultimate dismissals with prejudice. Interestingly, 
the statistically significant effect in Dodson (2012) is entirely concen-
trated among prisoner litigation claims brought by in forma pauperis 
prisoners; there is no significant change in the rate at which district 
courts dismiss claims in cases with represented plaintiffs.15  
Clermont and Eisenberg (2014) reported large apparent effects of 
Twombly and Iqbal that are concentrated among pro se cases. Their 
results are hard to compare to other results discussed here; their pre-
ferred measure is the ratio of pretrial judgments (including both dis-
missals and summary judgments) in favor of the defendant to pretrial 
judgments in favor of the plaintiff. For a related measure, the cumula-
tive likelihood of a pretrial judgment in favor of the defendant over the 
duration of a case, they report a statistically significant increase for 
cases filed after Iqbal relative to cases files before Twombly. These 
                                               
14 Excluding the “financial instruments” category of cases, which was affected 
by the home mortgage crisis that intervened between 2006 and 2010, the 
share of cases that ultimately were dismissed in the wake of a motion to dis-
miss fell from 56.8 percent to 56.2 percent, which is statistically indistin-
guishable from zero change. See Cecil et al. (2011b) at 7, table A-1 (calcula-
tions by author). 
15 This conclusion is based on analysis of Dodson (2012, 132 table 2). 
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changes could be due to Twiqbal, changes in summary judgment prac-
tice, or time trends induced by the Great Recession or other factors. 
While their analysis cannot disentangle these potential causes, Eisen-
berg and Clermont argue that Twiqbal must be part of the explana-
tion. 
Curry and Ward (2013) looked for differential patterns across fact-
pleading and notice-pleading states in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal. 
They searched for changes in patterns of removal from state to federal 
court, based on the theory that defendants in notice-pleading states 
will now have a greater preference for pleading standards in federal 
court. But they found no evidence that patterns of removal to federal 
court responded to Twombly and Iqbal, and no difference in response 
between notice pleading and fact pleading states.  
The largest reported change in dismissal rates appears in Quinta-
nilla (2013), who focuses on Title VII race discrimination claims by 
black plaintiffs. Quintanilla (2013; pp. 204–205) constructed a dataset 
of published court opinions in which Twiqbal is most likely to have an 
effect: cases not “on technical grounds,” such as statutory prerequi-
sites to suit under Title VII, but cases which are “ambiguous” in that 
the sole issue is the sufficiency of the factual pleadings. The change in 
the rate of MTD grants was 30 percent, which was highly statistically 
significant, despite a relatively small sample (289 opinions). The anal-
ysis did not distinguish between dismissals with and without preju-
dice, however. 
To date, the most comprehensive study of decisions on motions to 
dismiss is Reinert (2015). Reinert hand-coded approximately 4,200 
district court rulings on motions to dismiss from 2006 and 2010, using 
the federal court’s PACER system to sample from all rulings on mo-
tions to dismiss, regardless of whether the court’s opinion was pub-
lished or not. Other than Cecil et al. (2011a,b), this is the only prior 
study to use this methodology to generate a sample of rulings on mo-
tions to dismiss. Reinert found statistically significant increases in 
dismissal rates in 2010 relative to 2006. Like other studies, however, 
this result was driven by increases in dismissals with leave to amend; 
there were no statistically significant increases in dismissals with 
prejudice overall, or within any case category.  
All of these straightforward comparisons of observed dismissal 
rates, however, must be approached with caution, as they do not ac-
count for the possibility that Twombly or Iqbal had a major effect, but 
the mix of cases before and after these cases changed in ways that ob-
scured the true effect on dismissal rates. For example, if the plausibil-
ity standard announced in Twombly led many plaintiffs not to file suit 
at all, it is possible that the share of filed cases being dismissed may 
not change, even though many (potential) plaintiffs are nonetheless 
losing their day in court. I will discuss these effects, usually called “se-
lection effects,” more thoroughly in Part IV below. 
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Some recent work has attempted to address the possibility of 
changes in the composition of filed cases after Twombly and Iqbal. In 
my earlier study of the effect of Twombly (Hubbard 2013), I developed 
an empirical methodology to address selection effects, which Engstrom 
(2013) calls the “straddle” approach. The essence of this approach is to 
compare the outcomes of (1) cases that were filed before Twombly and 
which could have been dismissed before Twombly and (2) cases that 
were filed before Twombly, but which did not have an opportunity to 
be dismissed until after Twombly. By limiting my analysis to cases 
filed before Twombly, I controlled for potential changes in the compo-
sition of cases filed after Twombly. See Figure 1 for an illustration of 
the methodology. Applying this approach to a large dataset, I could 
reject the hypothesis that Twombly affected more than .4 percent of all 
cases. 
Gelbach (2012) systematically addressed selection effects and fo-
cuses on the outcomes of cases in the wake of Iqbal. He used a formal 
model to account for selection effects on the composition of cases with 
litigated motions to dismiss.16 He generated a lower bound on the 
number of cases “affected” by Twombly and Iqbal that represents 21.5 
percent of all cases in which a motion to dismiss was filed.17 To make 
this number comparable with my results described above, one must 
take into account that in the data used by Gelbach, 5.0 percent of all 
cases involved a motion to dismiss, which means that the lower bound 
for “affected cases” is about 1 percent of all cases.18 His results were 
very similar for employment discrimination cases.19 This lower bound 
on “affected cases,” however, includes the “effect” of repleading after a 
dismissal with leave to amend, as Engstrom (2013) points out. Using 
Gelbach’s (2012) methodology, but counting only dismissal with preju-
dice of a plaintiff’s case, Engstrom (2013) finds a lower bound of 11.3 
                                               
16 Given limitations in the data, Gelbach could not account for possible time 
trends in the composition of filed cases from 2006 and 2010. See Gelbach 
(2015) for a discussion of other potential limitations to his study and his re-
sponses to them. 
17 This number is statistically different from zero (Gelbach 2012, 2331). 
18 According to the FJC data Gelbach (2012) cites, motions to dismiss were 
filed in 5 percent of cases in the post-Iqbal sample period, and he estimated a 
lower bound of 21.5 percent of these filings were “affected” by Twombly and 
Iqbal. 21.5 percent of 5 percent is about 1.1 percent. 
19 Gelbach is careful to point out that the “negatively affected share” was low-
er for employment discrimination cases (15.4 percent rather than 21.5 per-
cent), a surprising result given the literature (Gelbach 2012, 2331–32). Be-
cause more employment discrimination cases involve motions to dismiss (9.0 
percent, id. at 2326), however, dismissals as a share of all employment dis-
crimination cases are slightly higher (15.4 percent of 9 percent is about 1.4 
percent). 
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percent of all cases with a filed motion to dismiss, which translates to 
.57 percent of all cases.20  
Gelbach (2016) explores the potential effects of Twiqbal later in lit-
igation, hypothesizing the greater screening at the pleading stage 
should—if the screening captures the merit of each case—lead to a 
higher-quality pool of cases that reach the summary judgment stage. 
Due to imprecise estimates, however, his results are inconclusive. 
Michalski and Wood (2015) looked for the effect of plausibility 
pleading, but not Twombly or Iqbal per se, on outcomes in state court. 
Taking advantage of the fact that Nebraska adopted the Twiqbal 
standard in 2010, they employed a difference-in-differences design 
that compares changes in dismissal rates and other outcomes over 
time in Nebraska to a set of comparison states that did not change 
pleading standards. They found no evidence of a major effect on dis-
missals or other outcomes. 
Finally, Hazelton (2015) examined whether the length and com-
plexity of complaints changed after Twombly and Iqbal. She finds evi-
dence that length and complexity of tort complaints rose after Twiq-
bal. 
III. NEW DATA 
I employ two datasets. The first, which I call the “AO Data,” is 
administrative data on all federal civil cases filed from 2003 to 2010. 
The second, which I call the “PACER Data,” consists of docket sheets 
and complaints from a stratified, random sample of federal civil cases 
filed from 2005 to 2010. 
These two data sets are notable for two reasons. First, the AO Da-
ta is based on a census of all cases, and the PACER Data is a repre-
sentative sample of all cases. Thus, both datasets overcome the most 
obvious limitation of previous studies that rely on searches of Westlaw 
or other databases of published judicial opinions. Such samples are 
not representative of cases as a whole, both because published opin-
ions are not a random sample of all judicial decisions, and because 
cases with judicial decisions are not a random sample of all cases. 
Second, the AO Data and PACER Data are among the largest da-
tasets of their kind yet brought to bear on the question whether 
Twombly or Iqbal has had an effect. Given that lack of statistical pow-
er is a serious limitation of many previous studies on Twiqbal, these 
datasets allow for higher power statistical tests capable of detecting 
effects of Twiqbal. Not only does this make it more likely that, if a ma-
jor effect exists, I will find it, but it also gives us more confidence that, 
if no major effect is found, such an effect does not exist. 
                                               
20 Again, the numbers for employment discrimination cases are similar, with 
a lower “negatively affected share” but a higher baseline rate of cases with 
motions to dismiss (10.8 percent of 9 percent is about .97 percent). 
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A. AO Data 
I have compiled a data set of over 400,000 civil cases filed in feder-
al court from January 2003 through September 2010 using data files 
collected and published by the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts (AO).21 My processing of the AO Data is described in de-
tail in Hubbard (2013); the current data incorporates more recent 
years of AO Data, however. One important difference from Hubbard 
(2013) is that below I present results both excluding and including pro 
se litigants, which, for reasons I have discussed elsewhere (see Hub-
bard 2016), I predict may be affected differently.22 (Hubbard [2013] 
excluded pro se litigants.) 
Summary statistics for the AO Data appear in Table 1. One im-
portant fact jumps from this table. In the aggregate, the rates of dis-
missal before and after Twombly, and before and after Iqbal, appear to 
be identical. Nor does it appear that Twiqbal has led to more settle-
ments or large changes in filing rates.23 
I note here two key limitations to the AO Data. First, the AO Data 
does not provide information on how many motions to dismiss were 
filed. I explore the filing of motions to dismiss with the PACER Data. 
Second, the AO Data does not distinguish between types of motions by 
which a case can be terminated on the merits before trial, including 
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the Rule 56 motion for sum-
mary judgment. Both fall into the disposition category “Judgment on 
motion before trial.”24 
To address this concern, I divide all cases coded as “Judgment on 
motion before trial” into two groups, based on the duration of the case 
at the time of termination and the prevailing party. I deem cases with 
durations of at least 45 and less than 225 days, and for which the pre-
vailing party was the defendant (or prevailing party information was 
missing), to be terminated on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; I create the 
dummy variable dismissal and set it equal to one for these cases. Cas-
es of the same duration, but in which the plaintiff prevailed, may be 
Rule 12(c) dispositions or other types of judgments (such as defaults). I 
deem cases with durations of 225 days or more to be terminated on a 
Rule 56 motion. I chose these boundaries to correspond approximately 
                                               
21 [Note to reviewers: I am in the process of obtaining data that will permit 
me to extend this dataset to include all cases filed through December 2014. 
Inclusion of this data has been delayed due to technical and administrative 
issues, however. Future revisions should be able to incorporate this data, 
which will allow a more complete assessment of longer-term changes after 
Iqbal.] 
22 I also exclude certain sui generis categories of litigation, such as defaulted 
student loans and prisoner litigation. 
23 For reasons I explain below in Part IV.B, I focus on “early settlements,” 
which are settlements that occur less than 225 days after the case is filed. 
24 This category may also capture Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the 
pleadings. 
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to the minimum and maximum amounts of time from filing of a com-
plaint to disposition of a motion to dismiss in what might be a typical 
case.25 This time range is consistent with various studies of time-to-
ruling on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.26 
Importantly, although these precise boundaries are somewhat arbi-
trary, my results are not sensitive to adjustments to the bounds.27 
B. PACER Data 
My second dataset, which I call the “PACER Data,” is composed of 
docket sheets and complaints from samples of federal civil cases filed 
between 2006 and 2010. These documents are downloaded as PDF 
files from the U.S. Courts’ PACER system. Due to the time and ex-
pense necessary to collect and code large numbers of docket records 
and complaints, I employed a stratified sample design to increase sta-
tistical power. Rather than drawing cases from all 90 federal districts, 
the PACER Data includes cases drawn from the 21 districts that could 
provide sufficiently large samples of docket sheets and complaints for 
three case types: employment discrimination, antitrust, and tort (a 
                                               
25 As a default, the defendant has 20 days to file a motion to dismiss (from the 
date the complaint is served; see Rule 12(a)(1)). 
26 A study of docket records in eight district courts, which found that average 
times to ruling varied widely across districts, but the district averages all fell 
in the range of 63 to 176 days. See IAALS (2009); Kourlis and Singer (2009). 
The duration range I use (45 to 224 days) also predicts dismissal and sum-
mary judgment rates consistent with the findings of studies that have calcu-
lated Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and Rule 56 summary judgment rates for specif-
ic years and districts. See Willging (1989); Cecil et al. (2007). 
 One concern with using this cutoff is that Twombly or Iqbal may have led 
to cases taking longer before being terminated by a dismissal. One might im-
agine that litigating a motion to dismiss takes longer after Twiqbal. All re-
sults below, which are based on an upper limit of 224 days for dismissal, are 
robust to increasing the limit to 365 days, and I find no evidence of changes 
in case duration, conditional on dismissal, within either the 224 day or 365 
day windows. (Results available upon request.) 
27 Clermont and Eisenberg (2014, p. 205 n. 43) claim that the zero result in 
Hubbard (2013) is sensitive to the choice of 224 days as the maximum dura-
tion for a 12(b)(6) dismissal, to the extent that they find that the increase in 
dismissals becomes positive and significant when one includes all pretrial 
judgments, rather than only those within 224 days of filing. This finding, 
while interesting in its own right, does not plausibly bear on changes in 
12(b)(6) dismissal rates. As noted in Hubbard (2013), the reported findings 
were fully robust to changes in the time frame for dismissal. In unreported 
regressions, the zero result obtains for durations of 365 and 590 days—more 
than twice as long for the preferred specification. Hubbard (2013) did not ex-
amine durations greater than 590 days, both because it was implausible that 
pretrial dismissals nearly two years after filing would be under Rule 12(b)(6) 
rather than Rule 56 and because data for longer time windows was not then 
available. 
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mix of vehicular negligence, products liability, medical malpractice, 
and the like).28  
Upon completion of the data gathering and processing, however, I 
determined that the antitrust data is not comparable to the other cat-
egories of cases, and I do not report results for antitrust cases.29 I also 
omit tort cases from the reported results below, as they less numerous 
than employment discrimination cases and yield imprecise results. 
Notably, though, results for tort cases roughly track the results re-
ported below for employment cases: apparent increases in the length 
of complaints and number of amended complaints filed, but no change 
in dismissals or other litigation outcomes. (In fact, out of the sample of 
113 cases, only two motions to dismiss were filed (one before Twombly, 
one after) and neither was granted.) 
Hence, to maximize statistical power and focus my analysis on 
those classes of cases most often cited as likely to be affected by 
Twombly and Iqbal, I limit the sample to employment discrimination 
cases—those cases designated as “civil rights: employment” cases by 
the Administrative Office. Summary statistics for the PACER Data 
appear in Table 2.30 
To create a random sample of cases within each sampled district, I 
used the AO Data to generate random samples of docket numbers 
within each sampled district for the sample time frame, and then, 
with the help of a team of researchers, I pulled the docket sheets cor-
responding to those docket numbers from PACER. For some purposes, 
I drew cases from narrowly defined time ranges, and as a consequence 
                                               
28 The districts are the California (Central, Northern, and Southern), Con-
necticut, DC, Florida (Middle and Southern), Georgia (Northern), Illinois 
(Northern), Massachusetts, Michigan (Eastern), Minnesota, New Jersey, New 
York (Eastern and Southern), Ohio (Northern), Pennsylvania (Eastern), Tex-
as (Northern and Southern), Utah, and Washington (Western).  As a practical 
matter, the limiting factor was antitrust cases, which are relevant because 
Twombly was an antitrust case, but which make up a very small fraction of 
all federal cases.  
29 Examination of administrative data and hand-coded docket records reveals 
large numbers of separate but related antitrust case filings, which leads to 
large numbers of virtually identical cases that are often consolidated in ways 
that leads to case outcomes (such as transfer or consolidation) that are not 
informative on the filing or resolution of MTDs. Given the small total size of 
the federal courts’ antitrust docket, expanding the sample frame could not 
overcome the obstacles to statistical power created by this fact, even if I were 
able to develop reliable means for removing or recoding related cases. In any 
event, results (unreported) using antitrust data reveal erratic patterns of dis-
position, and estimated effects of effects of Twombly and Iqbal are largely 
null, even if one assumes that the results are meaningful. 
30 The reader will note that MTDs are much more prevalent in the PACER 
data than the 6-percent-of-cases figure mentioned above for all cases. This is 
because the PACER cases are drawn from the employment discrimination 
category, which has relatively high rates of MTDs. See Cecil et al. (2011a). 
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there was no need for sampling, but I pulled all cases within the rele-
vant time range. 
Using those docket sheets, we identified and pulled from PACER 
the original complaint filed in each case. Analysis of the docket sheets 
and complaints proceeded in two ways. First, a team of student re-
search assistants (undergraduate and law students at the University 
of Chicago) hand-coded the docket sheets and complaints. Each hand-
coder worked independently and filled out an Excel spreadsheet with 
entries for each case in a separate row. In addition to verbal instruc-
tions on how to complete the spreadsheet, each coder was given a 
codebook defining each variable and the possible values it could take. 
Each coder also was given access to a Google Docs FAQ page, on which 
they could post questions, which I would answer with clarifications 
about the instructions, or guidance on how to code a complaint or 
docket sheet that presents a situation not contemplated by the code-
book. Because this FAQ was shared by all of the coders, this method 
for resolving ambiguities was designed to enhance consistency across 
coders. 
Hand-coding of complaints included counting paragraphs of allega-
tions and numbers of causes of action alleged, as well as subjective 
coding of the level of factual detail in the complaint. (To avoid trans-
mitting any unconscious bias on my part to the coders, I did not pro-
vide guidance to the coders on how they should judge the factual detail 
level of complaints. Further, some coders, as undergraduates, had no 
exposure to cases or teaching on the subject of pleading.) To facilitate 
more accurate machine-coding of complaints, hand-coders noted mate-
rials such as cover sheets and exhibits that were attached to com-
plaints, as well as the presence of stray marks that could interfere 
with accurate character recognition by text-analysis software. 
Hand-coding of docket sheets included noting the number of mo-
tions to dismiss and amended complaints, whether and how motions to 
dismiss were decided, and settlement and summary judgment out-
comes.31 
Machine-coding of the complaints utilized information provided by 
hand-coders on the document characteristics of the complaints. A re-
searcher at the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics wrote 
Python code to cycle through the hand-coders’ spreadsheets for infor-
mation on cover sheets and exhibit pages, find the original complaints, 
remove the cover sheets and exhibit pages, and save the resulting un-
adorned complaint as a new .pdf file.  The researcher then performed 
optimal character recognition (OCR) using ABBYY FineReader on 
each PDF file to create a plain text file.  These text files were analyzed 
                                               
31 The reported results include a subset of data in which all observations for 
any given United States District Court were coded by the same individual for 
all years, and thus any differences between coders in coding tendencies will 
not bias estimates of the effects of Twombly and Iqbal. (All regressions in-
clude fixed effects for district.) 
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for linguistic characteristics using the latest edition of Linguistic In-
quiry and Word Count, LIWC. LIWC is a software package that cata-
logues the words and punctuation in a text file, providing detailed sta-
tistics on the linguistic attributes of the file. 
IV. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS: CONSTRUCTING THE MOSAIC 
A. Methodological Considerations 
How can one conclude that Twiqbal had a major effect? There must be 
evidence showing an effect that is large (rather than small) and real 
(rather than spurious). Put more precisely, the three criteria that con-
stitute the gold standard for statistical evidence of a major effect are 
that the estimated effect be  
(1) Economically significant, 
(2) Statistically significant, and  
(3) Causally identified. 
Economic significance is simply jargon for something being big 
enough for us to consider it important. (I will sometimes use “major 
effect” as shorthand for “economically significant effect.”) Thus, eco-
nomic significance depends on the context, and ultimately is in the eye 
of the beholder. I will treat as economically significant an effect great-
er than 2 percent of all filed cases. In other words, if Twombly or Iqbal 
changes outcomes in two out of every hundred cases, I will consider 
this a “major” change. I consider this a relatively generous standard 
for a “major” change, given the alarm with which Twombly was greet-
ed—I am saying that its effect could be “major” even if 98 percent of 
all filed cases are unaffected! 
The reader, of course, is free to make her own judgments about 
what effects count as economically significant. Perhaps a better 
threshold is whether 1 percent or 5 percent of filed cases are affected. 
And perhaps a more appropriate baseline is not all filed cases, but 
some other number. The results reported in this paper permit the 
reader to apply whatever standard of economic significance she deems 
appropriate. 
With respect to changes other than case outcomes, I do not set a 
threshold for economic significance, as the prior literature has not 
staked out as strong predictions about changes in things such as the 
length or drafting of complaints. For those outcomes, I will focus solely 
on statistical significance. 
Statistical significance is a criterion for concluding that the es-
timated effect reflects a true difference in underlying behavior be-
tween two groups (such as pre-Twombly and post-Twombly) as op-
posed to a difference that arose simply by random chance. If an esti-
mated effect is not statistically significant, we lack confidence that the 
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effect is anything other than zero, but for random chance. I will treat 
as statistically significant any estimate with a p-value of .05 or below 
(i.e., statistical significance at the “5 percent level.”) This means, 
roughly, that there is only a 5 percent chance that the true difference 
is zero and we obtained our (nonzero) estimate by chance. 
Causal identification is jargon for an empirical test design that 
permits us to conclude that the estimated differences between a 
treatment group and a control group is due to the treatment (i.e., 
Twombly or Iqbal) and not some other factor. For our purposes, causal 
identification means that the design of the empirical test is such that 
we have some confidence that our estimated “effects” of Twiqbal were 
actually caused by Twiqbal, and not by some unrelated and unob-
served factor that is coincidental in timing with Twombly or Iqbal. 
This is a serious concern, because there are two categories of factors 
that present serious obstacles to causal inference here: (1) omitted 
variable bias and (2) selection effects. 
Omitted variable bias is the product of factors that an empirical 
study should take into account because they influence the outcome of 
interest but are omitted from the estimation, either because their rel-
evance is not recognized or because the factors simply cannot be 
measured. There are at least two potential omitted variables that 
could substantially undermine the validity of estimated effects of 
Twiqbal.  
First, since the turn of the century, there has been an overall 
downward trend in civil case filings in federal court. Thus, merely 
comparing filing rates before and after Twombly, for example, would 
lead one to observe a decline in filings after Twombly. Without control-
ling for preexisting trends in filing rates, though, it would be a mis-
take to conclude that Twombly caused the drop in filing rates. When 
the outcome of interest is filing rates, however, this potential source of 
bias is easy to correct: since trends in filing rates are observable, one 
merely needs to include controls for trends when estimating the effect 
of Twombly or Iqbal. The same technique could be used if there are 
pre-existing trends in outcomes such as dismissal rates and settle-
ment rates. 
Second, the Great Recession unfolded in the wake of Twombly, and 
just as it would be a mistake to infer that Twombly caused the Great 
Recession, it would also be a mistake to ignore the possibility that 
changes in behavior after Twombly or Iqbal are related to the Great 
Recession. It is unlikely that the type and quality of the cases filed 
during boom years are the same as the type and quality of cases filed 
during a recession. Further, even identical cases may be litigated dif-
ferently, if for example changed economic circumstances make parties 
more willing (or less willing) to settle. Nonetheless, the existing litera-
ture has done little to address the Great Recession as a possible con-
founding factor in measuring the effect of Iqbal. 
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There are at least two ways to handle this potential confound. The 
first is to find measurable factors, such as GDP or unemployment, 
that can be included in regressions as controls.32 As these factors rise 
and fall during the Great Recession, they serve as proxies for the larg-
er set of changes that can affect the composition of cases. The second 
is to look for variation across space, rather than time, in the effects of 
Twiqbal. While the Great Recession affected all of the United States, 
and Twiqbal applied to all federal courts, Twiqbal did not affect all 
state courts equally. Michalski and Wood (2015) thus present findings 
for which the potentially biasing effect of the Great Recession is re-
duced.  
Selection bias is a species of omitted variable bias, but it deserves 
separate treatment here. In a world in which parties and their law-
yers behave identically before and after Twiqbal, judges ruling on mo-
tions to dismiss will see the same sorts of cases and complaints before 
and after Twiqbal, and thus we can easily detect an effect of Twiqbal 
by looking for a difference in dismissal rates. But in the real world, if 
Twombly and Iqbal really do make a difference in how cases are de-
cided, then parties and their lawyers will take this into account. These 
endogenous responses to Twombly and Iqbal may change the nature 
and composition of cases that reach the motion-to-dismiss stage of liti-
gation. Complaints may become more detailed, some cases may not be 
filed that otherwise would be (or vice versa), some cases may settle 
that otherwise would be decided by a motion to dismiss (or vice versa), 
and so on. See Gelbach (2012) for a more extensive discussion. In prin-
ciple, at least, this means that it is possible that Twombly and Iqbal 
had a big effect, even though a simple comparison of dismissal rates 
before and after yields no discernable change. 
There is another type of selection effect, this one due to endoge-
nous responses by judges rather than lawyers or parties. Not all dis-
trict court rulings on motions to dismiss are published in legal data-
bases such as Westlaw, Lexis, or Bloomberg. Although over time these 
databases have become increasingly comprehensive in their inclusion 
of district court opinions, not all opinions on motions to dismiss are 
published, if only because not all opinions on motions to dismiss are 
written. And even if Twombly and Iqbal had no economically signifi-
cant effect on legal practice, there is no doubt that they had a major 
effect on legal doctrine. We therefore might expect district judges to 
change their patterns of writing and publishing decisions on motions 
to dismiss. If we rely only on published decisions, there is a concern 
that the effect we are detecting is an effect on publication practices, 
not courtroom outcomes. 
                                               
32 Unreported results explore this possibility in my data, but the inclusion of 
state-level GDP and unemployment controls offer surprisingly little in terms 
of explanatory power. 
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There are two ways to address selection effects, and I will employ 
them both in this paper. The first way is to control for selection effects 
by designing an empirical strategy to hold constant the composition of 
cases that are subject to dismissal before and after Twombly (and be-
fore and after Iqbal). To the extent that we can isolate subsets of cases 
that allow us to make apples-to-apples comparisons of dismissal rates 
before and after Twombly, and before and after Iqbal, we can detect 
the effect of Twombly and Iqbal by looking at dismissal rates. I call 
this the “causal identification” method. I describe and execute this ap-
proach in Part B below. 
While this method is the most direct and powerful way to detect an 
effect of Twombly or Iqbal, the empirical design that I use to obtain 
causal identification is only capable of detecting effects that occur soon 
after each case—what I call “immediate” effects. Thus, a second meth-
od is necessary to detect effects, if any, that are delayed or build up 
gradually over time. 
This second method is to look for selection effects, rather than con-
trol for them. For example, if changes in settlement rates are attenu-
ating the effect of Twiqbal on dismissal rates, then in addition to look-
ing at dismissal rates, we can look at settlement rates to see whether 
they change. I call this the “process of elimination”: if Twombly and 
Iqbal have had a major effect, it might not show up in dismissal rates, 
but it should show up somewhere. Thus, I will look not only at dismis-
sal rates, but settlement rates, filing rates, the length and content of 
complaints, and other potential sources of evidence for a major effect 
of Twiqbal. In this method, any single estimate of an effect (whether 
on dismissal rates, or filing rates, or complaint length, etc.) is only 
weak evidence for or against a major effect of Twiqbal, precisely be-
cause (unlike in the first method) I am unable to fully control for con-
founding factors such as the effect of the Great Recession on the com-
position of cases. Nonetheless, taking together all of the estimates of 
the various potential manifestations of the delayed effect of Twiqbal, 
we can form a more complete picture of the extent to which litigation 
patterns have changed in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal. I undertake 
this approach in Part C below. 
Before I go on, I discuss here some conventions I adopt for generat-
ing and reporting results. For both the causal-identification and pro-
cess-of-elimination methods, I will employ standard statistical estima-
tion techniques. I run linear and logistic regressions of outcomes such 
as dismissal rates on indicators of whether a case was before or after 
Twombly or Iqbal, with fixed effects for circuit and nature-of-suit cat-
egory and clustering of standard errors by district. For the logistic re-
gressions, I report marginal effects, so that the reported coefficients 
are interpretable as the change in the fraction of the cases dismissed 
after Twombly or Iqbal; a coefficient of .0100 would indicate a 1 per-
centage point change in the dismissal rate.  
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There is a special challenge in presenting results here, however, 
because of the need to distinguish between three types of results:  
(1) Statistically significant rejections of the null hypothesis of 
no effect;  
(2) Statistically significant rejections of the hypothesis of a ma-
jor effect; and  
(3) Null results, i.e., results that are statistically insignificant 
and close to zero, but not precise enough to rule out the possi-
bility of a major effect.  
In tables reporting results, statistically significant differences will 
be marked with stars or bold text.33 I will treat such results as “evi-
dence” of an effect of Twombly or Iqbal. Note, however, that a statisti-
cally significant effect is not necessarily evidence of an economically 
significant effect. I will also report whether the regression estimates 
reject an alternate null hypothesis of at least a 2 percentage-point 
change, i.e., an “economically significant” or “major” effect. To this 
end, in addition to reporting estimated coefficients and standard er-
rors, I include separate rows in the tables reporting regression results 
labeled “Major Effect?” Here, I provide a simple indicator summariz-
ing the regression results:  
“Yes” means that that the coefficient is statistically significant 
and consistent with a predicted, economically significant effect 
of Twiqbal. I does not mean, however, that I can reject the pos-
sibility of an economically insignificant effect. In this way, I re-
solve doubts in favor of concluding that there is a major effect. 
“No” means that the hypothesis of an economically significant 
effect is rejected.  
“Null” means that neither the null hypothesis of zero effect, 
nor the alternative hypothesis of a major effect, can be rejected.  
B. Controlling for Selection Effects: “Causal Identification” 
1. Establishing the Claim to Causal Identification 
As I have noted, the ideal method for estimating the effect of Twombly 
or Iqbal would allow for an apples-to-apples comparison of rulings on 
motions to dismiss before and after the relevant ruling. To do this, 
                                               
33 The minimum threshold for statistical significance I use herein is signifi-
cance at the 5 percent level for a two-tailed test, which is equivalent to signif-
icance at the 2.5 percent level for a one-tailed test. (A one-tailed test is ap-
propriate for rejecting the alternate hypothesis of an effect equal to or greater 
than a given threshold). 
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however, requires a methodology that accounts for several potentially 
confounding factors, as discussed above: 
1. Time trends in case filings and/or impact of the Great Re-
cession. 
2. Selection effect: endogenous change in filing of complaints. 
3. Selection effect: endogenous change in settlements. 
4. Selection effect: endogenous change in filing of motions to 
dismiss. 
5. Non-random selection of judicial decisions for publication. 
To date, no prior study—none—accounts for all of these threats to 
causal identification. I summarize the extent to which prior studies 
address these factors in Table 3. This is not to say that prior studies 
are not informative; after all, no study, not even one that makes 
claims to address these threats to causal identification, is immune 
from serious criticism. In Part C below, I present a framework to 
which all prior studies contribute. 
Here, I present my methodology for measuring the (immediate) ef-
fects of Twombly and Iqbal, based on the “straddle” method of Hub-
bard (2013) but with added elements such that I address all five of the 
possible selection effects enumerated above. For clarity, I organize the 
discussion of this methodology around how it addresses the five con-
founding factors listed above. 
Time trends, endogenous changes in case filings, and the 
Great Recession. Figure 1 illustrates the basic design for Twombly; 
the design for Iqbal is the same except for the time frames used. As 
Figure 1 shows, all cases in both the control and treatment groups 
were filed before Twombly. However, the cases in the control group 
had an opportunity to be dismissed before Twombly, whereas the cas-
es in the treatment group were subject to the possibility of dismissal 
only after Twombly.34 The same method applies to Iqbal.35 
How does this design address the first two confounding factors? 
First, it uses a relatively short time frame, so that estimates are not 
biased by long-term trends.  
Second, this method suppresses endogenous changes in case fil-
ings, because it looks only at cases filed before Twombly or Iqbal. Be-
cause Twombly’s “retirement” of the Conley dictum was largely a sur-
                                               
34 For Twombly, this means that I include cases filed April 6, 2006 to May 21, 
2006 (control group) and cases filed April 6, 2007 to May 21, 2007 (treatment 
group). I select these bounds based on the following logic: Twombly came 
down May 21, 2007. May 21 is 45 days after April 6; presumably a motion to 
dismiss will not be filed, briefed, and decided in less than 45 days. 
35 For Iqbal, I include cases filed April 3, 2008 to May 18, 2008 (control group) 
and cases files April 3, 2009 to May 18, 2009 (treatment group). Iqbal came 
down May 18, 2009. May 18 is 45 days after April 3. 
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prise to the bar, any effect of Twombly on the composition of filed cas-
es would occur only with respect to cases filed after the Twombly deci-
sion. Thus, the treatment group, which is made up of cases that were 
filed before Twombly but would have been dismissed (if at all) after 
Twombly, should have the same composition (in terms of claims, mer-
it, pleading style, etc.) as the control group, which are cases that were 
both filed and resolved before Twombly. The same argument can be 
made for Iqbal, given that it was not clear ahead of time that the Su-
preme Court would announce new law on plausibility pleading.36 
Third, for Twombly at least, the entire sample period precedes the 
Great Recession, and thus we avoid changes in the mix of disputes it 
may have precipitated. For Iqbal, though, the overlap with the Great 
Recession is unavoidable, and we might worry about changing case 
composition, due to factors unrelated to Iqbal, even in the narrow 
sample period I employ here.37  
Indeed, we can directly check these claims that the cases in each 
pair of treatment and control groups are similar. As part of the PAC-
ER Data, I collected one week’s worth of employment discrimination 
docket sheets and complaints for each of the treatment and control 
groups. Using the LIWC software, I analyzed all of these complaints to 
determine the extent to which the linguistic characteristics of the 
complaints are similar between treatment and control groups. The 
LIWC software counts total words and words per sentence in each 
complaint, as well as the percentage of all words that fall into specific 
linguistic categories. These categories and examples of each appear in 
Table 4. Panel A focuses on the Twombly control (2006) and treatment 
(2007) groups. The linguistic characteristics of these two groups are 
virtually identical, and none of the differences are statistically signifi-
cant. The Twombly sample thus presents an apples-to-apples compari-
son in terms of the composition of filed cases. 
Panel B of Table 4 focuses on the Iqbal control (2008) and treat-
ment (2009) groups. These groups are generally similar, but tests of 
differences in means reveal some statistically significant differences, 
suggesting either that Iqbal was not entirely a surprise, or that the 
composition of filed cases changed due to external reasons such as the 
Great Recession. Examining the characteristics with significant dif-
ferences, however, calls into doubt the possibility that the cases were 
                                               
36 Or at least plausibility pleading generally. The petitions for certiorari were 
addressed specifically to pleading standards and substantive doctrine regard-
ing vicarious liability of government officials. See Petition for Certiorari, Has-
ty v. Iqbal, No. 07-827, 2007 WL 4466875 (U.S. Dec. 17, 2007); Petition for 
Certiorari, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, No. 07-1015, 2008 WL 336225 (U.S. Feb. 6, 
2008). 
37 For evidence of changes in the composition of cases during the Great Re-
cession, see Cecil et al. (2011a), who document a tripling in the number of 
“financial instruments” (read: home foreclosure and debt collection) cases be-
tween 2006 and 2010. 
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changing in anticipation of Iqbal. All of the changes are in the wrong 
direction—detail seems to be going down: indicators of complexity 
(“words per sentence” and “words longer than six letters”) are declin-
ing as a percentage of all words, while some vague language (“tenta-
tive words”) is going up. Nonetheless, there is evidence that something 
about the cases changed between 2008 and 2009, perhaps related to 
the Great Recession, which means we must be cautious in drawing 
inferences regarding Iqbal.  
Endogenous changes in settlements. Because cases that are 
filed shortly before Twombly (or Iqbal) can be settled after, the “strad-
dle” method described here cannot in itself preclude selection effects 
due to changes in settlement patterns. Thus, there is the possibility of 
selection effects before the motion to dismiss stage, at what I will call 
the “early settlement stage.” By “early settlements,” I mean settle-
ments that occur between the filing of a lawsuit and the end of the 
224-day window that I use for when motion to dismiss can be granted. 
To rule out this possibility (to the extent the data permits), I di-
rectly check for changes in early settlement rates among cases in both 
the Twombly sample and the Iqbal samples.38 In Table 5, I report the 
results of regressions where the outcome variable is the settlement 
rate during the first 224 days of litigation—the same window during 
which I allow for dismissal in the AO Data. Panel A presents results 
for the Twombly treatment and control groups, and Panel B presents 
results for the Iqbal groups. I present results both including and ex-
cluding pro se cases, and for all cases and specifically for employment 
discrimination cases.39 All of the relevant coefficients are statistically 
insignificant and close to zero, although for some specifications, one 
cannot rule out the possibility of economically significant effects. This 
provides some assurance that our ability to infer effects from changes 
in dismissal rates is not compromised by changes in settlement pat-
terns. 
                                               
38 In the analysis herein, I test for changes in settlement rates. Ideally, how-
ever, one would test for changes in the composition of settled cases in addi-
tion to changes in settlement rates. This is because offsetting changes in set-
tlement patterns of different groups can leave the overall rate of settlement 
unchanged. For example, if Twiqbal effected a meaningful increase in the 
courts’ ability to screen cases on apparent merit, plaintiffs may choose to set-
tle (for a small sum) relatively weak cases that previously would have been 
litigated, while defendants may litigate (by filing a MTD) somewhat stronger 
cases that previously would have been settled (for a somewhat larger sum). If 
these two groups of cases are about the same size, the settlement rate may 
not change significantly, even though the composition of litigated cases has 
meaningfully changed. Without data on settlement amounts—which is noto-
riously hard to get—it is difficult to directly test for such a change.  
39 Recall that much of the literature on the negative effects of Twombly and 
Iqbal expresses concern over a greater impact on employment discrimination 
plaintiffs and pro se plaintiffs. 
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Endogenous changes in filings of motions to dismiss. The 
fourth potential confound, changes in defendants filing motions to 
dismiss, is eliminated by my choice of outcome variable: share of all 
filed cases that are terminated by dismissal. For a case to end in this 
way, it must be the case that both the defendant filed a motion to dis-
miss and the court granted it. Thus, a rise in either of these would 
lead to a rise in the percentage of cases dismissed.40  
Endogenous changes in publication of judicial opinions. The 
final potential confound, the non-random selection of judicial decisions 
for publication, is eliminated by my choice of data. All data I collect is 
based on court records of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 
which contain all federal civil cases during the sample period. 
With these assurances about a lack of potential confounds (but 
with a caveat about the Great Recession and the Iqbal data), I now 
estimate the immediate effects of Twombly and Iqbal on dismissal 
rates.  
2. Results 
Table 6 presents the results. Panel A focuses on Twombly. In all 
specifications, we find evidence of no effect; the largest effect not ruled 
out is less than 2 percent of cases. This is true for both represented 
and pro se plaintiffs.41 
Panel B focuses on Iqbal. Again, in all specifications there is evi-
dence of no effect. Thus, I can rule out the possibility of economically 
significant effects. In sum, there is no evidence that Twombly or Iqbal 
had an immediate effect on the tendency of district courts to dismiss 
complaints with prejudice. Indeed, the causal identification method I 
employ provides affirmative evidence that these cases did not have 
any major effect on dismissal rates. 
C. Looking for Selection Effects: “Process of Elimination” 
One may be skeptical that it is feasible to construct a test for the ef-
fects of Twiqbal that has solid causal identification. Further, one may 
want to search for evidence of a delayed effect of Twiqbal. Pre-existing 
trends in case filings, the near-simultaneity of Iqbal and the Great 
Recession, and the possibility of selection effects attenuating any ef-
fect of Twiqbal on dismissal rates together pose serious challenges to 
                                               
40 Of course, this assumes that Twombly or Iqbal would not lead to a drop in 
the filings of motions to dismiss. This would be possible, perhaps, if a higher 
rate of settlement led to fewer motions to dismiss, but given no evidence of a 
rise in early settlement rates, a more generous standard to defendants should 
lead to a rise in motions to dismiss. 
41 The coefficients on the “Twombly × pro se” variable supply the estimated 
effect of Twombly on pro se plaintiffs, relative to the effect on represented 
plaintiffs. 
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the empirical researcher. Can anything further be done? Must we ig-
nore the studies that do not attempt causal identification? 
In my view, something can be done, and we can make use of stud-
ies that lack a serious effort at causal identification. The methodology 
I propose here can be described as a “process of elimination.” If we 
cannot control for selection effects and undertake an apples-to-apples 
comparison of cases before and after Twombly or Iqbal, we must in-
stead ask ourselves, “What do we expect to see, given that we have 
controlled for as much as possible, but cannot control for selection ef-
fects, which may or may not be present?” In answering this question, 
we will generate a series of hypotheses. Rejecting or accepting any one 
of them will hardly be conclusive, because we cannot be sure that se-
lection effects, rather than treatment effects (i.e., the effect of 
Twombly or Iqbal), are not at play. But rejecting or accepting each hy-
pothesis lets us rule out or rule in the possibility of a major effect of 
Twiqbal, conditional on the presence or absence of certain selection 
effects. While this process of elimination cannot account for every way 
that Twiqbal might have had an indirect effect, or every way that se-
lection effects might prevent us from observing an effect—after all, I’m 
making no claim to causal identification here!—the accumulation of 
results will start to form a picture of behavioral changes after Twiqbal 
that will render alternative possibilities less likely. 
1. Hypothesis 1: Assumption of No Selection Effects 
Let us begin with the simplest case: a world in which there are no 
(meaningful) selection effects. This may or may not be the world we 
live in; just because actors in the legal system respond endogenously 
to changes in legal rules does not mean that selection effects are of 
sufficient magnitude that we cannot detect major effects of Twiqbal. 
Indeed, Klerman and Lee (2014) show that under a range of plausible 
assumptions, while selection effects can attenuate the effects of law 
changes on case outcomes, major effects will still be detectable. Thus, 
notwithstanding all the efforts at causal identification presented in 
this paper, it may be entirely proper to assume that selection effects 
are not a first-order concern.  
If they are not, then a simple before-versus-after comparison of 
dismissal rates will tell us the effect of Twiqbal. The change in motion 
to dismiss grant rates can manifest itself with respect to either or both 
of dismissals with prejudice and dismissals without prejudice. If dis-
missals with prejudice rise—and this is the concern that has motivat-
ed most of the concerns about Twiqbal—then the effect will show up in 
the rate at which cases are terminated. If dismissals without prejudice 
rise, this will show up in case terminations (if plaintiffs do not re-
plead) or in the filing of amended complaints.  
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Further, even if the rate at which courts grant motions to dismiss 
does not change, the number of dismissals could rise if more motions 
to dismiss are filed. 
Also, if there is a rise in dismissals (with prejudice), we might ex-
pect to see downstream effects. By definition, fewer cases will reach 
discovery and settlement, summary judgment, or trial. And if the rate 
of settlement does not change, this means that fewer cases will reach 
the summary judgment stage, and the quality of those cases may 
change. As Gelbach (2016) argues, if dismissals do a good job screen-
ing out weaker cases, then the rate at which defendants win summary 
judgment may fall. If dismissals do a poor job, the rate may not 
change or may rise.  
Taken together, the assumption of no selection effects yields the 
following set of predictions: 
Hypothesis 1(a). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically signifi-
cant rise in dismissals (with prejudice) as a fraction of all cases. 
Hypothesis 1(b). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically signifi-
cant rise in dismissals without prejudice as a fraction of all 
cases. 
Hypothesis 1(c). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically signifi-
cant rise in the total number of motions to dismiss filed. 
Hypothesis 1(d). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically signifi-
cant change in the number of cases terminated due to sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant as a fraction of all 
cases. 
Table 8 collects the existing studies that generate results bearing 
on Hypothesis 1. Table 8a summarizes findings relevant to all cases, 
while Table 8b focuses on findings specific to cases filed by pro se 
plaintiffs. Table 8 reveals the following:  
H1(a). With respect to all cases, the overwhelming majority of 
results are null results, and the two statistically significant re-
sults on Hypothesis 1(a) point in opposite directions: Gelbach 
(2012) finds a statistically significant lower bound (.57 percent 
of all cases) on the effect of Twombly and Iqbal combined, while 
Hubbard (2013) finds a statistically significant zero result for 
the effect of Twombly (no more than .40 percent of all cases).  
H1(b). Several studies have looked at rulings on motions to 
dismiss, and all have found a statistically significant rise in 
dismissals without prejudice after Twombly or Iqbal.  
H1(c). Cecil (2011a,b) found a 2.2 percentage-point increase 
from 2006 to 2010 in the share of cases in which a motion to 
dismiss was filed. 
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H1(d). Two studies have looked for downstream effects of 
Twiqbal, but they have found only null results.42 
H1, pro se cases. To the extent that prior work has looked at 
pro se plaintiffs, it tends to find a statistically significant rise 
in outcomes adverse to plaintiffs. 
With these findings in mind, I now turn to the results of my analysis 
of the AO Data and PACER Data. I begin with Hypothesis 1(a) and 
employ a graphical presentation before turning to regression results. 
The AO Data reveal the long-term trends in the rate at which filed 
cases are dismissed. Figure 2 plots the fraction of cases filed in a given 
year that are eventually dismissed.43 I take advantage of the fact that 
Twombly and Iqbal occurred almost exactly two years apart to divide 
the data into one-year intervals beginning on May 19 of each calendar 
year. For example, the one-year period before Twombly is given by the 
data point labeled 2006–07, and the one-year period after Iqbal is giv-
en by the data point labeled 2009–10. Figure 2 presents dismissal 
rates for all cases, all civil rights, cases, and all employment cases.  In 
all three of these cuts of the AO Data, dismissal rates are flat 
throughout the time period.44 
Tables 9 and 10 report regression results, controlling for differ-
ences across circuits and types of cases, as well as correlations within 
districts. (The reader will note that Tables 9 and 10 examine the same 
outcome as Table 6. Tables 9 and 10 have the benefits of larger sample 
sizes and longer time frames, but at the cost of no claim to causal 
identification.) Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 report results excluding 
pro se plaintiffs. The results are fairly precise zeros, and I can easily 
reject the hypothesis of a major effect of Twombly or Iqbal. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 include pro se plaintiffs. Here, the 
estimated effect on represented plaintiffs is again a precise zero, but 
                                               
42 Both Gelbach (2016) and Reinert (2015) report no meaningful change in 
summary judgments granted in favor of defendants. Reinert (2015, Table 13) 
reports a fall in plaintiffs’ overall success rate from 71% for cases with MTDs 
in 2006 to 62% for cases with MTDs in 2010, although no significance levels 
are reported. During the same interval from 2006 to 2010, Reinert reports a 
rise in “unresolved” cases from 3% to 17%, presumably due to the fact that 
the cases from 2010, being about 4 years more recently filed, are much less 
likely than cases from 2006 to have concluded by the time the sample was 
collected. Among resolved cases, plaintiffs’ success rate is 73% in 2006 and 
75% in 2010. 
43 Recall that the definition used here is dismissal by the court on a judgment 
before trial between 45 and 224 days after filing. The pattern is robust to 
changes in this definition. Recall, too, that I define “all” cases to exclude large 
but sui generis categories of cases, such as student loan defaults and prisoner 
petitions. This is consistent with the existing literature, and does not change 
the overall results.  
44 Results for antitrust cases are qualitatively similar, but as noted above 
may not be reliable and are not reported herein. 
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the interaction terms “Twombly × Pro se” and “Iqbal × Pro se” are pos-
itive and significant. This indicates that Twombly and Iqbal each were 
followed by statistically significant rises in the rate at which courts 
dismissed cases brought by pro se plaintiffs. Note, however, that this 
apparent effect, though statistically significant, is small, and I can re-
ject the hypothesis of a “major” change. In short, Table 9 indicates no 
effect for represented plaintiffs, and a small but statistically signifi-
cant effect for pro se plaintiffs. 
Table 10 repeats the exercise for employment discrimination cases. 
Here, I find fairly precise zeros for the apparent effect on both repre-
sented and pro se plaintiffs. This tends to undermine the oft-stated 
prediction that employment discrimination plaintiffs have been par-
ticularly harmed by Twiqbal. 
One concern with using AO Data, as noted above, is that it does 
not distinguish motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim from 
other pretrial judgments on the merits. The PACER Data, which re-
flects examination of docket sheets for details of the basis for case dis-
position, addresses this concern. In Table 11, Panel A, I use the PAC-
ER Data to replicate the approach taken with the AO Data. Columns 
(1) and (2) estimate the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on dismissals 
with prejudice. All results are null, and the coefficients are substan-
tively small, although I cannot rule out economically significant mag-
nitudes. 
Columns (3) and (4) use a different dependent variable. Rather 
than dismissal with prejudice, these specifications focus on cases ter-
minated after a plaintiff did not file an amended complaint when the 
original complaint was dismissed without prejudice. (These cases 
would be treated as equivalent to dismissals with prejudice in the AO 
Data.) Here again, all results are null. 
The PACER Data’s information on dismissals without prejudice al-
lows me to examine H1(b) as well. Panel B of Table 11 uses the num-
ber of dismissals without prejudice as the dependent variable. (Note 
that dismissal without prejudice can occur multiple times in a single 
case.) Estimated effects of Twombly and Iqbal are very small and sta-
tistically insignificant. 
Hypothesis H1(c) predicts an increase in the tendency of defend-
ants to files motions to dismiss. Given that there is no expectation 
that judges will be less willing to grant motions to dismiss after Twiq-
bal, one might expect a large increase in motions to dismiss to imply a 
large increase in dismissals—and we have already seen that the latter 
has not happened. Perhaps surprisingly, then, the data indicate a 
sharp rise in the rates at which defendants file motions to dismiss, at 
least after Iqbal. Panel C of Table 11 reports the results of a regres-
sion with the number of motions to dismiss filed as the dependent var-
iable. While there is a null result for Twombly, the estimated coeffi-
cient for the effect of Iqbal is highly significant and would represent 
an additional motion to dismiss being filed in nearly 13 percent of all 
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cases. Given that motions to dismiss were filed in about 20 percent of 
cases in 2005 in the PACER Data, this is an enormous increase over 
the pre-Twombly period! I will return to the question of how such a 
large increase in motions to dismiss could have so little effect on dis-
missal rates below, as I continue the “process of elimination.” 
Hypothesis H1(d) considers whether changes in dismissal rates 
have downstream effects in litigation. Given the small and statistical-
ly insignificant point estimates of changes in dismissal rates, it is un-
likely that Twombly and Iqbal would have any effects on summary 
judgment rates or the like, and the results in Panel D of Table 11 con-
firm this prediction. Columns (1) and (2) present results of regressions 
with summary judgment in favor of the defendant as the dependent 
variable. All results are null, and in fact the point estimates for Iqbal 
are negative.  
* * * 
Now, what can we conclude, given that Hypotheses 1(a), 1(b), and 
1(d) have been rejected? We have rejected the joint claim that (1) 
Twiqbal had a major effect on dismissals and (2) there are no selection 
effects. On the other hand, it appears that the data support Hypothe-
sis 1(c), that filings of motions to dismiss will rise.  
If we are looking for an effect on  case outcomes (rather than mo-
tion practice), it is still possible that Twiqbal had a major effect, but if 
so, we must now look for the selection effects that are operating and 
possibly masking the effect on dismissals. To do this, we can work 
backward from the motion to dismiss and look for evidence at earlier 
stages in the litigation process. 
Let’s take a look at the stages of primary behavior and litigation 
that lead up to the dismissal decision, working our way backward 
from the dismissal decision. (Figure 3 serves as an outline for the dis-
cussion that follows.) We begin with the possibility that patterns of 
settlement between the filing of the complaint and any ruling on a mo-
tion to dismiss have changed in response to Twiqbal, and this change 
in the composition of cases being litigated has masked the effect of 
Twiqbal on dismissal rates. 
2. Hypothesis 2: Assumption of No Selection Effects before 
Early Settlement 
There is the possibility that there are selection effects before the mo-
tion to dismiss stage, at the early settlement stage. Even if the exact 
same cases with the exact same complaints are filed before and after 
Twiqbal, patterns of settlement may change—for example, some 
plaintiffs may have to settle for small sums in order to avoid a motion 
to dismiss under the plausibility pleading standard. This yields our 
second prediction: 
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Hypothesis 2. Twiqbal will lead to a statistically significant 
rise in observed early settlements as a fraction of all cases. 
Table 12 lists the one prior study bearing on Hypothesis 2. Pereya 
& Sunshine (2015) find no change in settlement rates after Twombly 
or Iqbal statistically significant at the 5 percent level. With this find-
ing in mind, I now turn to the results of my analysis of the AO Data 
and PACER Data.  
I begin with a graphical presentation before turning to regression 
results. The AO Data reveal the long-term trends in the rate at which 
filed cases are settled early. Figure 4 plots the fraction of all cases, civ-
il rights cases, and employment cases filed in a given year (beginning 
May 19) that are settled early.45 In all three data series, there is no 
perceptible change in early settlement rates after either Twombly or 
Iqbal.  
I now turn to regression analysis, using the same specification as 
above, except with early settlement, rather than dismissal, as the out-
come of interest.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 13 report results for all 
cases in the AO Data. Columns (3) and (4) report results for employ-
ment cases. No results find a significant change, and with only one 
exception (settlement rates for pro se, employment discrimination 
plaintiffs after Iqbal) all reject the hypothesis of a major effect.  
Data on early settlement from the PACER Data present a slightly 
different picture. Table 14 presents results of linear and logistic re-
gressions of the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on early settlement rates. 
Interestingly, although the estimated coefficients for Iqbal are very 
small, positive, and statistically insignificant, the estimated coeffi-
cients for Twombly are larger in magnitude, negative, and in the lo-
gistic specification they are statistically significant.  
Taken together, the AO Data and PACER Data suggest no major 
effect on early settlement patterns, although the PACER Data raise 
the possibility that motion practice directed to pleadings may have 
crowded out early settlement in the immediate aftermath of Twombly. 
This is consistent with the premise that uncertainty about legal 
standards inhibits settlement because it increases the likelihood that 
the parties have divergent expectations about their probabilities of 
success. 
* * * 
At this point, we have rejected the Hypothesis that Twiqbal has 
increased dismissals or other adverse case terminations for plaintiffs, 
but we are beginning to see a pattern emerge of changes to litigation 
practice even if not litigation outcomes. We saw above that filings 
rates for motions to dismiss have risen, and we now see evidence, albe-
                                               
45 Recall that the definition used here is settlement between 45 and 224 days 
after filing. The pattern is robust to changes in this definition.  
30 Hubbard: Empirical Effects of Twombly and Iqbal 
it quite mixed, of a change in early settlement rates. It is still possible 
that Twiqbal has had a major effect in other respects, but if so, we 
must now look for selection effects earlier in the process. This brings 
us to our third step. 
3. Hypothesis 3: Assumption of No Selection Effects before 
Pleading 
Next, there is the possibility that Twiqbal changed the way that com-
plaints are pleaded. Even if the same cases are filed before and after 
Twiqbal, plaintiffs and their attorneys may have changed how they 
plead in order to avoid the specter of dismissal under a new, higher 
pleading standard. This can take the form of original complaints con-
taining more factual detail, as well as show up in an increase in the 
filing of amended complaints, either in anticipation of (or in response 
to) a dismissal with leave to amend. This yields our third prediction: 
Hypothesis 3(a). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically signifi-
cant rise in the observed length and/or detail in original com-
plaints. 
Hypothesis 3(b). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically signifi-
cant rise in the number of amended complaints. 
Table 12 lists the one prior study bearing on Hypothesis 3. Hazel-
ton (2015) finds no statistically significant change in measures of 
pleading specificity in civil rights complaints after Twombly or Iqbal, 
but does find a statistically significant increase in measures of plead-
ing specificity in torts complaints after Iqbal but not after Twombly. 
With this finding in mind, I now turn to the results of my analysis of 
the PACER Data. (The AO Data contains no information on plead-
ings.)  
Table 15 presents results for Hypothesis 3. It presents the results 
of hand coding and automated text analysis of the PACER Data. Panel 
A examines several measures of the length and factual detail of com-
plaints that speak to H3(a). “Word Count” is generated by the LIWC 
software; “Factual Paragraphs” is a count of the number of paragraphs 
judged by the coder to contain factual allegations. “Number of Legal 
Claims” is a count of the separate causes of action alleged in a com-
plaint; a drop in this count may indicate that plaintiffs have been de-
terred from bringing particular causes of action, even Twiqbal has not 
deterred lawsuits as a whole. “Detail score” reflects the coder’s holistic 
judgment about the amount of factual detail in the complaint. For 
none of these measures do Twombly or Iqbal have any statistically 
significant effect.46 In short, there is no support for Hypothesis 3(a) in 
the data. 
                                               
46 In unreported results, I also examine changes in other attributes of the 
pleading text, as measured by LIWC, such as “number words,” “certainty 
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Panel B bears on Hypothesis 3(b). It measures the change in num-
ber of times a complaint is amended in given case. Here we see evi-
dence of a large change. In the first row of Panel B, the dependent var-
iable is an indicator for whether an amended complaint was filed in 
the case; the estimated coefficients reflect the change in the share of 
cases in which a complaint was amended. In the second row, the de-
pendent variable is the total number of amended complaints filed in 
each case. Thus, the estimated coefficients in this regression capture 
changes in the frequency of amendment; even a case that would have 
seen an amended complaint before Twiqbal, had it been filed then, 
would have more amendments if filed after Twiqbal. Although not all 
coefficients are statistically significant, most are, and the magnitudes 
of the coefficients are fairly consistent across regressions. It appears 
that Twombly and Iqbal are associated with a large increase in re-
pleading: approximately a 10 percentage point increase in the number 
of cases in which an amended complaints is filed. 
* * * 
Now what, given rejection of Hypotheses 1 and 2 and these mixed 
results for Hypothesis 3? As the discussion of Hypothesis 1 indicates, 
there appears to have been a dramatic escalation in motion-to-dismiss 
filing activity, but no corresponding increase in dismissals, either with 
or without prejudice. We now see why this may be so. Although plain-
tiffs’ lawyers may not have substantially changed their drafting prac-
tices for initial pleadings, it appears that they consistently are able to 
respond to a motion to dismiss by repleading in greater detail. 
The data lend some further support to this interpretation of the 
results. In cases without motions to dismiss filed, an amended com-
plaint is filed only 20.2 percent of the time, while in case with a mo-
tion to dismiss filed, an amended complaint is filed 48.5 percent of the 
time. Thus, the results so far indicate that although Twiqbal may 
have had only modest effects on case outcomes, pleading and motion 
practice appear to have responded in significant ways. 
Of course, it is also possible that Twiqbal had statistically signifi-
cant effects earlier in the litigation process. This brings us to our 
fourth step. 
4. Hypothesis 4: Assumption of No Selection Effects before 
the Decision to Sue 
Next, there is the possibility that Twiqbal has not affected filed cases 
because it has deterred from filing those plaintiffs whose cases would 
have been affected. It may also change pre-suit settlement patterns, 
                                                                                                                     
words,” “words per sentence,” “words longer than six letters,” and other po-
tential markers of attempts to plead in greater factual detail. These regres-
sions yield null results as well. 
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which could either lead to an increase in filings (because defendants 
refuse to settle) or a decrease in filings (because plaintiffs are willing 
to settle for less). It is also possible that Twiqbal has increased the 
number of state court cases removed to federal court by defendants. 
This yields our fourth prediction: 
Hypothesis 4(a). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically signifi-
cant change in the number of original federal case filings, rela-
tive to trend.  
Hypothesis 4(b). Twiqbal will lead to a statistically signifi-
cant rise in the number of cases removed from state court to 
federal court, relative to trend. 
Table 12 lists the one prior study bearing on Hypothesis 4. Curry 
and Ward (2013) finds no statistically significant change in removal 
rates from state court to federal court after Twiqbal. With this finding 
in mind, I now turn to the results of my analysis of the AO Data. (The 
PACER Data does not bear on this Hypothesis.)  
I begin with a graphical presentation before turning to regression 
results. The AO Data reveal the long-term trends in the rate of origi-
nal case filings and removals. Figure 5 plots the yearly filing rates of 
all cases, civil rights cases, and employment cases. In all three data 
series, there is no perceptible change in filing rates after either 
Twombly or Iqbal. There is a downward trend in filings that begins 
before Twombly but levels off around the time of Iqbal. Given that 
there is no claim that Iqbal would lead to an increase in filings rela-
tive to trend, this break in trend is best explained as the result of the 
Great Recession. 
I now turn to regression analysis, using the same specification as 
above, except that the unit of analysis is not the case, but the district-
month, and the outcome of interest is number of filings in that district 
during that month. Table 16 reports results from regressions where 
the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of original case fil-
ings. Table 17 reports results where the dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of removals from state court.47 In these regressions, 
I attempt to control for trends several different ways.48 The results are 
inconclusive. Once I control for time trends, results are not statistical-
ly significant, and one of the point estimates is the “wrong” sign. The 
estimates are imprecise, which means that although I find no evidence 
                                               
47 I use logs because the number of filings varies widely across districts, and 
we should expect the effect of Twiqbal to reduce filings per district propor-
tionally to the total number of filings in the district rather than by an abso-
lute number. (For example, a district with 10 filings and district with 100 
filings might both see filings drop by 10 percent, not by 10 filings.) The coeffi-
cient on a logged variable is approximately the estimated percentage change. 
48 In addition to the baseline specification with a linear time trend, I include 
quadratic and cubic time terms. Inclusion of higher-order polynomials does 
not improve inference. 
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in favor of Hypothesis 4, I cannot rule out the possibility of large ef-
fects in the predicted direction. In other words, while these results 
provide no evidence of an effect of Twombly and Iqbal on case filing, 
they provide no evidence against such an effect, either. 
* * * 
Now, where do we stand? We have inconclusive results on original 
filings and removals. Thus, we cannot rule out a major effect here, but 
we still lack affirmative evidence of a major effect. They only place left 
to look for such affirmative evidence is in the behavior farthest re-
moved from litigation. I turn to this possibility now. 
5. Hypothesis 5: Effect on Primary Behavior 
Finally, there is the possibility that the change in the pleading stand-
ard affected primary behavior in a significant way. Given that some 
cases that previously would have made it to discovery will now be 
dismissed, potential defendants may now be more willing to violate 
the law. Measuring this effect is no small task, of course, and given 
how modest the effects that appear to exist in every stage of litigation, 
it is doubtful that a significant effect could exist at the point most re-
mote from the direct effects of Twombly and Iqbal.49 Nonetheless, 
primary behavior is of primary importance to evaluating the effects of 
any legal change, and thus I note the final hypothesis here: 
Hypothesis 5. Twiqbal will lead to a statistically significant 
increase in behavior that could lead to civil liability (but which 
may now be less likely to do so). 
V. CONCLUSION: VIEWING THE MOSAIC 
With two methodologies and two datasets, each with subparts, and 
a large literature to build upon, this paper has attempted to cover a lot 
of ground. I encapsulate the findings in Table 18. To sum up: 
Causal Identification. After a careful effort to address 
threats to causal identification, and using both AO Data and 
PACER Data, I reject the hypothesis of an economically signifi-
cant, immediate effect of Twombly or Iqbal. The claim to causal 
identification for Iqbal, however, is weaker than for Twombly, 
                                               
49 The PACER Data codes for the presence of damages demands, punitive 
damages claims, and the amount of damages alleged, and I had planned to 
measure effects on primary behavior by looking for shifts in damages de-
manded. Feedback from coders, however, indicated that the data on ad dam-
nums is likely unreliable; and in any event such data is missing for 78 per-
cent of all otherwise-coded observations. 
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due to the difficulty of controlling for the effects of the Great 
Recession. 
Process of Elimination. Collecting both existing results from 
the literature and new results using both AO Data and PACER 
Data, I look for a wide range of direct and indirect effects of 
Twombly and Iqbal, including delayed effects. As Figures 2, 4, 
and 5 illustrate, there is little evidence of economically signifi-
cant effects on dismissal rates, settlement rates, or filings. 
There is, however, evidence of a rise in motion to dismiss filing 
rates, and—rather than a rise in dismissal rates—a corre-
sponding rise in the filing of amended complaints. There is evi-
dence from the existing literature of effects on rates of dismis-
sal without prejudice and of larger impacts on pro se plaintiffs.  
The mosaic of my new results and results from existing studies 
forms a surprisingly coherent picture of the fallout from Twombly and 
Iqbal, at least for represented plaintiffs: no change in dismissal rates, 
settlement rates, or filings, but an increase in attention to pleading by 
both plaintiffs and defendants. For pro se plaintiffs, there is some evi-
dence of small but statistically significant effects on case outcomes. 
Still, there remains the question of what they mean. None of these 
conclusions change the fact that Twombly and Iqbal are the most im-
portant decisions on federal pleading in a half-century, nor can they 
change the fact that these cases have become prominent fixtures in 
debates among practitioners, judges, and academics on civil procedure. 
But the accumulating mass of empirical findings tends to refute 
the claims that Twombly and Iqbal touched off anything like a revolu-
tion in legal practice, or that Twombly and Iqbal have had devastating 
effects on plaintiffs generally, or even employment discrimination 
plaintiffs in particular. 
Taken together, these findings tend to corroborate the view of the 
civil litigation process that I emphasize in Hubbard (2016), one in 
which the economic incentives of litigants may be sufficiently powerful 
that some aspects of legal doctrine do not affect case outcomes, be-
cause they do not impose binding constraints on behavior. To be more 
concrete, given the often great expense associated with litigation, po-
tential plaintiffs will rarely file suit unless they already have at their 
disposal facts sufficient to satisfy them that they have a good shot at 
prevailing, and this will be true regardless of whether the pleading 
standard requires the plaintiff to plead facts or not. While it may have 
been true that a complaint that failed to a state a plausible claim for 
relief would have survived a motion to dismiss in the time before 
Twombly, it would have been rare that such a complaint would ever be 
filed in the first place.  
Put another way, the Supreme Court’s statements on plausibility 
pleading in Twombly and Iqbal may have merely written into doctrine 
an approach to pleading that reflected, to some extent, existing prac-
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tice. But it is important to recognize that the Court’s pronouncements 
were nonetheless destabilizing, at least insofar as pleadings and mo-
tion practice did react to the new doctrine. 
The fact that plausibility may have been implicitly, even if not ex-
plicitly, a part of prior practice explains how a rise in motions to dis-
miss could fail to budge the rates at which complaints are dismissed 
with prejudice: even if a plaintiff does not plead sufficient facts in her 
original complaint, she almost certain knows facts that she can plead 
in an amended complaint that, at the very least, make the claim for 
relief plausible. This also explains why we might see a differential ef-
fect for pro se plaintiffs; unsophisticated parties may have a poor 
sense of whether their facts entitle them to relief, and thus more pro 
se complaints may be marginal under a plausibility pleading stand-
ard. 
Finally, I note that the normative import of these results is ambig-
uous. While the lack of a dramatic and obviously harmful effect on 
plaintiffs suggests that the normative stakes for Twiqbal are lower 
than originally assumed, the increase in pleading activity suggests 
that Twiqbal has not been costless to litigants (or judges).On the other 
hand, the increase in pleading activity may have some benefits as 
well. If a motion to dismiss induces a plaintiff to provide a more com-
plete picture of the claim, this may sharpen the issues going forward 
in a way that reduces costs later in the process. Thus, while this paper 
has identified empirical effects of Twombly and Iqbal on court prac-
tice, it leaves for another day the task of evaluating the costs and ben-
efits of these effects.  
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FIGURE 1: “STRADDLE” DESIGN FOR MEASURING EFFECT OF TWOMBLY 
 
 
Note. The design for Iqbal is identical, except with dates May 18, 2008, and May 18, 2009 (Iqbal), respectively. 
May 21, 2006 May 21, 2007 (Twombly) 
Control Group Treatment Group 
Dismissal 
Opportunities Filings Filings 
Dismissal 
Opportunities 
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FIGURE 2: DISMISSAL RATES, BY YEAR FILED 2003–2009, 
YEARS BEGINNING MAY 19 
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FIGURE 4: EARLY SETTLEMENT RATES, BY YEAR FILED 2003–2009,  
YEARS BEGINNING MAY 19 
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FIGURE 5: YEARLY CASE FILING RATES 2003–2009,  
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TABLES  
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS, AO DATA 
  Year Beginning May 19 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
       
All Cases Filings 82,520 83,389 81,573 82,940 84,356 
 Dismissal Rate .014 .015 .013 .012 .012 
 Settlement Rate .216 .217 .223 .218 .201 
       
Antitrust Filings 678 775 883 691 472 
 Dismissal Rate .021 .014 .016 .005 .022 
 Settlement Rate .090 .090 .050 .164 .055 
       
Civil Rights Filings 21,914 21,403 20,956 22,064 22,686 
 Dismissal Rate .017 .017 .014 .012 .012 
 Settlement Rate .160 .163 .167 .174 .154 
       
Employment Filings 10,875 10,414 9,845 10,157 10,689 
 Dismissal Rate .011 .011 .010 .009 .009 
 Settlement Rate .150 .163 .163 .172 .158 
       
Shares Tort .068 .066 .066 .061 .063 
 Contract .260 .270 .269 .306 .296 
 Civil Rights .266 .257 .257 .266 .269 
       
Notes. Years correspond to one-year intervals relative to Iqbal decision. Twombly was decided May 21, 2007, and 
Iqbal was decided May 18, 2009. 
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS, PACER DATA  
 Calendar Year of Filing 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Indicator Variables       
Dismissal w/ Prej. .035 .041 .047 .045 .056 .070 
Dismissal w/o Prej., 
No Amendment 
.009 0 .008 .017 0 .010 
SJ for Defendant .180 .189 .228 .168 .161 .134 
Plaintiff Loss .215 .219 .284 .224 .217 .204 
Early Settlement .105 .041 .032 .045 .112 .075 
Continuous Variables       
No. of MTDs Filed .219 .291 .228 .296 .434 .378 
No. of Amendments .219 .316 .362 .486 .469 .393 
Factual  
Paragraphs 
23.7 30.8 27.2 26.3 29.3 26.3 
Number of Claims 3.31 3.47 2.94 3.25 3.71 3.19 
Detail Score 3.15 3.23 3.17 3.22 3.27 3.30 
N 228 196 127 179 143 201 
Machine-Coded Variables      
Word Count 2140 2334 1922 2346 2516 2520 
N 386 376 211 326 175 352 
Note. Means reported. Standard deviations omitted for clarity but available 
upon request.
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FJC (2011); Reinert (2015); 
Clermont & Eisenberg (2014) 
Other 
 Studies* 
Time Trend /  
Great Recession 
X    
Selection: Filing of  
Complaints 
X X   
Selection: Pre-MTD  
Settlement 
 X   
Selection: Filing of MTDs X X   
Selection: Publication X X X  
Notes. * Hannon (2008); Hatamyar (2010); Hatamyar Moore (2012); Brescia (2012); Dodson (2012); Seiner (2009, 2010); Isaacharoff and 
Miller (2013); Quintanilla (2013, 2011); Janssen (2011); Pereyra and Sunshine (2015). 
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TABLE 4. PACER SAMPLE RESULTS: COMPLAINT ANALYSIS 
 
PANEL A. TWOMBLY 
 2006 2007 P-value 
Word Count 2931 3146 .519 
Words per Sentence 28.3 31.9 .327 
% Dictionary Words 59.4 58.0 .137 
% Words Longer  
than Six Letters  
28.0 27.3 .215 
% Quantifier Words 
(e.g., few, many, much) 
1.73 1.72 .847 
% Number Words 
(e.g., second, thousand) 
.40 .42 .522 
% Perceptual Words 
(e.g., observe, heard, feel) 
.46 .44 .692 
% Tentative Words 
(e.g., maybe, perhaps) 
1.43 1.35 .382 
% Certainty Words 
(e.g., always, never) 
.98 .89 .059 
N 128 119  
Notes. Sample is all employment cases filed May 14–20 of 2006 and 2007. 
Reported p-values are from a t-test for difference in means. p-values below 
.05 appear in bold. Text analysis used Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC 2007) software. 
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TABLE 4 (CONT.). PACER SAMPLE RESULTS: COMPLAINT ANALYSIS 
 
PANEL B. IQBAL 
 2008 2009 P-value 
Word Count 2795 2919 .646 
Words per Sentence 30.5 28.0 .014 
% Dictionary Words 59.5 59.0 .571 
% Words Longer  
than Six Letters  
28.3 26.9 .011 
% Quantifier Words 
(e.g., few, many, much) 
1.59 1.72 .069 
% Number Words 
(e.g., second, thousand) 
.44 .48 .280 
% Perceptual Words 
(e.g., observe, heard, feel) 
.36 .42 .241 
% Tentative Words 
(e.g., maybe, perhaps) 
1.31 1.50 .010 
% Certainty Words 
(e.g., always, never) 
.85 .90 .257 
N 127 120 84 
Notes. Sample is all employment cases filed May 11–17 of 2008 and 2009. 
Reported p-values are from a t-test for difference in means. p-values below 
.05 appear in bold. Text analysis used Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC 2007) software. 
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TABLE 5: IMMEDIATE EFFECTS ON EARLY SETTLEMENT RATE, AO DATA 
 























Null Null No No 
















 Null  Null 
N 14,157 16,217 2,014 2,446 
 























Null Null Null Null 
















 Null  Null 
N 14,339 16,341 2,189 2,657 
Notes. Linear regressions with circuit and nature-of-suit dummies. Standard 
errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. 
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TABLE 6: IMMEDIATE EFFECTS ON DISMISSAL RATE, AO DATA 
 























No No No No 
















 No  No 
N 14,060 16,113 1,575 2,446 























No No No No 
















 No  No 
N 14,339 16,341 1,941 2,657 
Notes. Logistic regressions with circuit and nature-of-suit dummies. Stand-
ard errors clustered at the district level are reported in parentheses. Margin-
al effects reported. OLS results (unreported) are very similar. 
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TABLE 8. HYPOTHESIS 1: PRIOR STUDIES 
 
PANEL A. ALL CASES 
 





MTD Grant Rate 
(with prejudice) 







  Hatamyar (2010) Null  
  Seiner (2009) Null  
  Seiner (2010) Null  
  Brescia (2012) Null  
  Cecil et al. (2011a,b) Null  
  Hubbard (2013) Null  
  Reinert (2015) Null  
  Dismissal Rate, 
All Filed Cases 
Hubbard (2013) No  


















  Hatamyar (2010) Yes  
  Cecil et al. (2011a,b) Yes  
  Dodson (2012) Yes  
  Reinert (2015) Yes  
 
1(d) Overall Plaintiff 
Win Rate 




  Reinert (2015) Null  
  Summary  
Judgment  
Gelbach (2016) Null  
  Reinert (2015) Null  
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TABLE 8. HYPOTHESIS 1: PRIOR STUDIES 
PANEL B. PRO SE PLAINTIFFS 
 











  Brescia (2012) Null  
 1(b) MTD Grant  
Rate (without 
prejudice) 
Dodson (2012) Yes  
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TABLE 9. H1(A): CHANGES IN DISMISSAL RATE IN ALL CASES, AO DATA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




















Major Effect? No No No No 












Major Effect?   Null No 





Major Effect?   Null No 
N 265,140 265,140 304,937 304,937 
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) exclude pro se cases. Columns (3) and (4) include 
pro se cases. All errors clustered at the district level. Nature of suit, circuit, 
and season dummies, and linear time trend included. One and two asterisks 
denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Standard errors appear in parentheses.  
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TABLE 10. H1(A): CHANGES IN DISMISSAL RATE IN EMPLOYMENT CASES, 
AO DATA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




















Major Effect? No No No No 












Major Effect?   No No 





Major Effect?   Null No 
N 41,115 41,115 50,198 50,198 
Notes. Columns (1) and (2) exclude pro se cases. Columns (3) and (4) include 
pro se cases. All errors clustered at the district level. Nature of suit, circuit, 
and season dummies, and linear time trend included. One and two asterisks 
denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
Standard errors appear in parentheses.  
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TABLE 11. H1: DISMISSAL RATES, PACER DATA 
 
PANEL A. H1(A): DISMISSALS WITH PREJUDICE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




















Major Effect? Null Null Null Null 
N 1,074 1,074 1,074 1,074 
 










Major Effect? Null 
N 1,074 
Notes. Standard errors clustered on coder. Linear regressions include fixed 
effects for district. Marginal effects are reported for logistic regressions. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 11 (CONT.). H1: DISMISSAL RATES, PACER DATA 
 










Major Effect? Yes 
N 1,074 
 
PANEL D. H1(D): SUMMARY JUDGMENT OUTCOMES 
 (1) (2) 












Major Effect? Null Null 
N 1,074 1,074 
Notes. Standard errors clustered on coder. Linear regressions include fixed 
effects for district. Marginal effects are reported for logistic regressions. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 12. HYPOTHESES 2–5: PRIOR STUDIES 
 






All Filed Cases 




3(a) Complaint Detail 
Hazelton (2015) 
(civil rights cases) 
Null  







--- ---  
 4(a) Filing Rate --- ---  
 4(b) Removal Rate 
Curry & Ward 
(2013) 
Null  
 5 Primary Behavior --- ---  
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TABLE 13. H2: CHANGE IN EARLY SETTLEMENT RATES AFTER  
TWOMBLY AND IQBAL, AO DATA 
























No No No No 














 No  No 








 No  Null 





N 212,914 248,585 33,592 42,083 
Notes. Linear regressions with errors clustered at the district level. One and 
two asterisks denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, re-
spectively. All regressions have circuit, season, and nature-of-suit dummies 
and linear time trend. 
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TABLE 14. H2: EARLY SETTLEMENT 
 (1) (2) 












Major Effect? Null Null 
N 1,074 1,074 
Notes. N = 1074 for most regressions. Standard errors clustered on coder. 
Linear regressions include fixed effects for district. Marginal effects are re-
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TABLE 15. H3: PLEADING PRACTICE 
 
PANEL A. H3(A): PLEADING LENGTH AND DETAIL 





























Major Effect? Null Null Null Null 
N 1,074 1,074 1,074 1,074 
 
PANEL B. H3(B): COMPLAINT AMENDMENT 
 (1) (2) (3) 
















Major Effect? Null Yes Null 
N 1,074 1,074 1,074 
Notes. N = 1074, except N = 1826 for Word Count regression. Linear regres-
sions with fixed effects for district. Standard errors clustered on coder. Mar-
ginal effects are reported for logistic regressions. 
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TABLE 16. H4(A): CHANGES IN ORIGINAL FILING RATE, AO DATA 
 
PANEL A. TWOMBLY 
 (1) (2) (3) 










Null Null Null 
N 3,204 3,204 3,204 
 
PANEL B. IQBAL 
 (1) (2) (3) 










Null Null Null 
N 3,204 3,204 3,204 
Notes. Filings are measured in natural logs. Linear regressions with errors 
clustered at the district level. Nature of suit, district, and month-of-year 
dummies included. One and two asterisks denote statistical significance at 
the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Standard errors appear in parenthe-
ses. Districts with 0 filings in any given month are dropped. Twombly sample 
frame is June 2005–May 2008. Iqbal sample frame is October 2007–
September 2010. 
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TABLE 17. H4(B): CHANGES IN REMOVAL RATE, AO DATA 
 
PANEL A. TWOMBLY 
 (1) (2) (3) 










Null Null Null 
N 2,484 2,484 2,484 
 
PANEL B. IQBAL 
 (1) (2) (3) 










Yes Null Null 
N 2,484 2,484 2,484 
Notes. Filings are measured in natural logs. All errors clustered at the dis-
trict level. Nature of suit, district, and month-of-year dummies included. One 
and two asterisks denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. Standard errors appear in parentheses. Districts with 0 filings 
in any given month are dropped. Twombly sample frame is June 2005–May 
2008. Iqbal sample frame is October 2007–September 2010. 
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TABLE 18. SYNOPSIS OF OLD AND NEW FINDINGS  







H1(a) Dismissals Mixed No No 
H1(b) Dismissals Without 
Prejudice 
Yes Null --- 
H1(c) MTD Filing Rate Yes Yes  
H1(d) Summary Judg-
ment Outcomes 
Null Null --- 
H2 Settlements Null Mixed --- 
H3(a) Complaint  
Detail 
Null Mixed --- 
H3(b) Amended Com-
plaints 
--- Yes --- 
H4(a) Original Case Fil-
ings 
--- Null --- 
H4(b) Removals Null Mixed --- 
H5 Primary Behavior --- --- --- 
Notes. “Yes” indicates an estimate statistically significantly different from 
zero and consistent with an effect on 2 percent or more of cases. “No” indi-
cates statistically significant rejection of null of 2 percent effect. “Null” indi-
cates statistically insignificant estimates. “Mixed” indicates a mix of “Yes,” 
“No,” and/or “Null.” 
 
